The arrest in August of 176 North Koreans discovered in a

Both Washington and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) have expressed their disapproval with the Thai authorities' initial decision to imprison and eventually repatriate 159 of the Koreans, where they would have faced punishment for defecting.  While Southeast Asia has become the endpoint for many Korean escapees, their journey begins in northeast China and is propelled by Beijing's policies toward refugees.

The People's Republic of China, a signatory of the UNHCR's 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its subsequent protocols, continuously violates its agreement to ensure the safety of those seeking asylum.  The Convention states that "No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.”  However, Chinese security forces have detained and returned North Koreans attempting to enter foreign embassies in the capital and have conducted round-ups of suspected refugees in the Tumen River region, where over 200,000 are estimated to be in hiding.  One instance of this policy occurred in 2000 when seven North Koreans, who had already been granted refugee status by the UNHCR, were arrested and sent back to the DPRK.  These crackdowns carried out by Beijing have forced underground aid groups to smuggle Koreans to nations such as Thailand or Vietnam in hopes that they will have a better chance at receiving asylum. 

Danger Upon Return

The fate of Koreans returned by the Chinese authorities is revealed in a report by Amnesty International, which states that Article 47 of the DPRK's Criminal Code asserts "A citizen of the Republic who defects to a foreign country or to the enemy in betrayal of the country and the people ... shall be committed to a reform institution for not less than seven years. In cases where the person commits an extremely grave offence, he or she shall be given the death penalty..."     

Much of the information we receive on North Korean refugees comes from South Korean human rights organizations.  Corroborated accounts by refugees confirm the existence of labor and "re-education" camps where returnees are tortured and killed.  At these facilities, women who became pregnant while in China are forced to have abortions and infanticide is carried out on children born to Chinese fathers. Other defectors, whose community was called together by officials in the North Korean town of Namyang, witnessed the public execution of three returned refugees - an act designed to discourage any further attempts to cross into China.

Beijing's Suppression of Refugees' Rights

Chinese officials prevent the UNHCR and other humanitarian groups from entering areas where refugees are believed to be hiding.  Many crossed into China after the DPRK's economic collapse and devastating famine of the 1990s, which is estimated to have killed over one million Koreans.  Beijing categorizes these North Koreans as "economic migrants" and, according to Refugees International, instructs citizens to report any sightings of illegal migrants to the authorities. Human Rights Watch reports that beginning in May of 2002, Beijing began to increase its security forces by erecting barbed wire fences in the capitol's embassy district. The NGO makes available on its website a memorandum that they say was issued to all foreign embassies warning them not to assist asylum seekers.  The notice addresses the new security measures as a means of protecting the embassies' security and implores them to hand over all intruders. 

Foreign officials have also experienced difficulties shedding light on the subject within China. The Washington Post reports that, in January 2005, several plainclothes agents shut down a press conference being held by visiting South Korean politicians in Beijing. Microphones and lights were abruptly turned off as the group was to address the press on their fact-finding trip about the situation of North Korean refugees.  The agents prevented the dignitaries from speaking to reporters and only let them make a brief statement alter being held at bay for nearly 13 hours.  South Korean officials demanded an explanation for the blackout and have received no answer from the Chinese authorities.       

Why China Doesn't Comply

The failure of China to honor its obligations under the 1951 Convention stems from fears of its own security.  By forcibly returning North Koreans, the People's Republic is attempting to set a precedent that it hopes will discourage further migration.  If the number of Koreans coming into China were to grow, it could lead to the further destabilization of Kim Jong-il's regime.  From Beijing's perspective, it is better to proa up the DPRK, rather than see it implode.

The six-party talks, aimed at persuading Kim to relinquish his nuclear arsenal and halt further production, also have direct implications for the refugee crisis.  Beijing, which has hosted the discussions involving both Koreas, the US, Russia and Japan, has traditionally had the most sway over the reclusive state and is now faced with critical decisions.  Does it apply pressure onto Pyongyang to come clean with its enrichment program, while making it more vulnerable to military offensives; or let the North keep its weapons in efforts to deter a pre-emptive strike by Washington or even Tokyo?  A bellicose outcome to the nuclear standoff would certainly result in the mass exodus of North Koreans across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers as passage to the south is prohibited by the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone.              

For China, an even more frightening consequence of  a North Korean collapse would be the deployment of American forces along its border.  A reunified peninsula could mean the realignment of US solders, now numbering over 30,000 in South Korea, to areas right in China's backyard.  To avoid this potential security threat, Beijing is taking whatever steps it deems necessary, including repatriating refugees, to keep the DPRK's head above water.  

Enforcing the 1951 Convention

China's permanent representative to the United Nations, Wang Guangya, once referred to the 1951 Convention as the "Magna Carta of international refugee law." Beijing has also indicated that this agreement will take precedence over domestic laws in the case of a contradiction. In order to bring the Chinese into compliance with these laws, the UNHCR would have to enforce Article III,5 of the Convention, which would call for Beijing to give the organization unimpeded access to refugees and to all project sites.  Also, Article XVI, known as "binding arbitration", could be applied to counter China's categorization of all North Koreans as illegal economic immigrants. This would provide the framework to employ a third party to decide if an individual meets the qualifications to gain refugee status, in the event of a dispute between the UNHCR and China. 

Other instruments that could be used to pressure China are incentives found in the North Korean Human Rights Act, adopted by Washington in 2004.  The legislation strongly calls for Beijing's cooperation with the UNHCR as well as granting the agency the types of access called for in all treaties and agreements.  Section 305, Article A-4, asserts that if Beijing begins to comply with its obligations, the United States will provide humanitarian assistance to defray costs associated with the presence of North Korean refugees.

China's failure to comply with refugee law is not only impacting the asylum seekers themselves, but is now creating a burden for its Southeast Asian neighbors.  Beijing's support for the Kim regime has done little to improve the quality of life for North Koreans and thus has not alleviated the conditions that compel Koreans to leave their home in the first place.  China's claims that it is a responsible and cooperative power can only be regarded as questionable while it continues to violate these international covenants. 

Photo source: Humanrightshouse.org